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Analyzing Complicity in Risk
Jerry Busby*
When risks generate anger rather than fear, there is at least someone who regards the im-
position of those risks as wrongdoing; and it then makes sense to speak of the involvement
in producing those risks as complicity. It is particularly relevant to examine the complicity of
risk bearers, because this is likely to have a strong influence on how far other actors should go
in providing them with protection. This article makes a case for analyzing complicity explic-
itly, in parallel with normal processes of risk assessment, and proposes a framework for this
analysis. It shows how it can be applied in a case study of maritime transportation, and exam-
ines the practical and theoretical difficulties of this kind of analysis. The conclusion is that the
analysis has to be formative rather than summative, but that it could provide a useful way of
exposing differences in the assumptions of different actors about agency and responsibility.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the many issues ignored in conventional
risk assessment is that of complicity: the involvement
that various groups have in the generation of a risk,
not as primary agents, nor as the notional risk man-
agers, but as people whose action in some way con-
tributes to the risk. This idea of complicity should
be a central concern in risk analysis if we regard this
analysis as a route to fairness and reasonableness in
ascribing responsibility, accepting or rejecting risks,
in working out how much to spend mitigating them,
and in prioritizing them for attention.
Having an understanding of complicity looks es-
pecially necessary when, as Douglas (1986) argues,
risks generate anger rather than fear. Once the rele-
vant emotion is anger, the imposition of the risk—or
the failure to reduce it—is seen not merely as being
harmful but also wrongful. The risk becomes a rea-
son for anxiety and for blame or censure.When this is
the case, being involved in the production of that risk
can be called “complicity,” not just involvement. And
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the question of who has the complicity becomes cen-
tral to who should take responsibility and who should
protect risk bearers. It also plays a role in determin-
ing whether the anger is taken seriously. Where the
risk bearers are themselves complicit, the rest of the
world is going to find any anger less defensible, how-
ever understandable.
In practice, complicity occurs rarely if ever as
an explicit object of analysis in risk assessment. We
might assess the probability of trespassing on a rail-
way and the probability of fatality in the event of
trespassing, and use the result to decide how much
to spend on keeping trespassers out. But we do not
assess how complicit they are in the risks they bear,
and how much less complicit are child trespassers
than adults, and what effect this complicity should
have on our spending decisions. Perhaps we exclude
such ideas to preserve a notion that risk assessment
is value-free and difficult problems of responsibility
belong elsewhere. But we have come to realize that
even conventional risk assessment is not value-free,
and not independent of assumptions about deserv-
ingness.
The purpose of this study was to find a way of
analyzing complicity, in particular cases, in support
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of risk assessment. This was to be seen not as a way
of reaching a definitive, consensual measure, but as
a way of reasoning about the link between involve-
ment in a risk and the responsibility to deal with it.
We are used to the idea of requiring risk creators and
“owners” to use risk assessment processes to reflect
on how they produce risk. It seems reasonable by ex-
tension to say that other groups who are complicit in
a risk, including risk bearers, should reflect on their
contributions.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. References to Complicity
The idea of complicity gets only occasional at-
tention in the risk literature. Commentary on the
risk society includes the idea that complicity arises
from our increasing interdependence and increas-
ingly diffuse nature of responsibility (Beck, 1992).
There is a kind of complicity when a community—
with a shared knowledge of its industrial history—
produces a compliant and consensual response to
the discovery of serious toxic contamination (Za-
vestoski et al., 2002). And complicity gets a men-
tion in cases where it looks like collusion of differ-
ent groups against the wider public. De Marchi and
Ravetz’s (1999) analysis of cases of “postnormal sci-
ence” includes the development of genetically modi-
fied crops, and they talk of “the apparent arrogance
of the multinationals and the complicity of govern-
ments.” We therefore get a sense of complicity as
something to be found in many layers of organiza-
tion: as a state of society in general, as a state of
a more local community, or as a state of specific
groups.
The “complicity” label arises more naturally in
connection with consumption rather than production
risks. Kline (2004) in particular uses it to describe
the behavior of consumers who take risks with their
well-being in their choice of lifestyle. Kline’s study
is of the moral panic surrounding unhealthy food-
stuffs, and he analyzes how the issue has involved
children, whose ambiguous status is of only partially
competent consumers. Adult consumers can broadly
be assumed to be sufficiently competent to reason
about risk and give an informed consent, but this is
clearly more problematic for children. The general
case of consumption risks therefore points to high
levels of complicity on the part of risk bearers, to the
point where they might even be regarded as princi-
pals rather than mere accomplices in the risks they
bear. But this is always going to need qualifying ac-
cording to what kind of people they are.
2.2. Links with Voluntarism
Early thinking about the perception of risk in
terms of voluntariness (Starr, 1969) can also be con-
nected with complicity, in the sense that volunteering
for exposure to a risk could be said to make someone
complicit in it. There has been a substantial critique
of voluntarism. For example, the apparent effects of
voluntarism on risk acceptability can readily be ex-
plained away by alternative constructs (Slovic et al.,
1980), the distinction between the voluntary and in-
voluntary incurring of danger is not objectively iden-
tifiable (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), voluntariness
can be just as much a matter of perception as risk
itself (Jasanoff, 1998), and there are problems with
definition and circumstances (Cross, 1998). Activities
that appear to be voluntary, for example, driving au-
tomobiles, may not feel voluntary to people who be-
lieve it is forced on them by circumstances or selected
for them by culture. Nonetheless, voluntarism has a
useful heuristic value in prioritizing risks for our at-
tention. It is easier to justify spending resources on
risks that seem involuntary to the risk bearers.
Complicity is not synonymous with voluntarism.
Someone is complicit in the risk they bear of being
shot in their own home if they own a firearm, for ex-
ample, without volunteering to bear the risk of be-
ing shot. But it shares with voluntarism an idea of
how an involvement in the origin of a risk changes
someone’s obligations and entitlements. Justifying
the protection of people from themselves has always
been harder than justifying their protection from ex-
ternal forces, and ideas such as the welfare state have
considerably lost their appeal—even in the eyes of
their natural supporters (Simon, 2003). Some com-
mentators suggest an increasing inclination of the
state to criminalize risk to the self, for example, via
seatbelt laws (Adams, 2003). But this still looks like
the exception, and perhaps arises from the experi-
ence that risks to the self also impose costs on others.
So in a general sense both volunteering for a risk and
being complicit in it have a parallel role in influencing
our priorities for risk management activity.
2.3. Attitudes of Complicity
The literature gives us no sense, however, that
people feel particularly complicit in the risks they
bear. If anything it indicates the opposite. The idea
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that natural dangers have been transformed into
decision-based risks (Luhmann, 1993), attitudes that
harm is no longer inevitable (Sjo¨berg, 1987), and
the mentality that there should always be someone
to blame (Penning-Rowsell, 1996) all suggest a ten-
dency to distance ourselves from the origins of risk.
There is a whole range of readily available discourses
that we use to attribute collective risks to “theOther”
(Bickerstaff & Walker, 1992). We seem to have trav-
eled from the idea of attributing harmfulness to fate
to an idea of attributing it to risk managers without
considering the possibility of attributing it to our-
selves. And—because what we do is blame and be-
come angry—we also think risks are not just worry-
ing but wrongful. There are exceptions: Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982) argue that we hear less of skin can-
cer contracted from sunbathing because it is not a
risk that can be mobilized to criticize an industry—
something that could be construed as people recog-
nizing their own complicity. But generally the re-
placement of fatalism with agency has produced a
burden for risk managers rather than the population
at large. This seems bound to produce risk managers
whose central concern is risk to their own reputations
(Power, 2004). And it seems bound to produce a pub-
lic increasingly disenchanted with risk management
actions.
What we seem to lack is an understanding that
the social order that confers protections of various
kinds is the same order that produces risks, and that
it is often unreasonable to elect for one but not the
other. Beck (1992) refers to our “complicity” in the
risks of modernism, and the notion that these risks
are the byproducts of the choices we have made or at
least gone along with. But Beck’s view does not look
like that of the typical citizen, and Leiss and Choci-
olko (1994) essentially argue that both individuals
and organizations will do little more than try to take
the benefits associated with some activity and off-
load the risks onto others. They are not going to be
able to do the offloading unless they show some con-
viction that they are somehow entitled to do it. More-
over, it may be difficult to understand complicity in a
complex society in which there is extensive division
of labor, “structural secrecy” (Vaughan, 1996), and
atomization, alongside complicated systems of pro-
duction and governance. This all makes it hard for
individuals to identify the links between risk bear-
ing and taking benefits unless they particularly look
for them. When they do see such links they may
well see them in isolation, not as a normal aspect of
living.
Of course, this does not mean that the people
lack a capacity to see complicity in others, partic-
ularly when the others are corporate actors. A re-
cent example of public judgments of complicity can
be found in an outbreak of avian influenza in a pro-
cessed poultry facility in the United Kingdom, in
early 2007. The company in question was judged
to be culpable of certain lapses of biosecurity that
might have contributed to the outbreak (e.g., Poul-
ter, 2007). Many of the live birds in the facility were
culled, and the company received compensation for
the culled (but not diseased) birds. There was public
outrage that a company that was clearly complicit in
the risk of outbreak could later receive compensation
in this way (e.g., McGurran, 2007).
2.4. Emphasizing the Agency of Principals
Risk studies similarly seem to have emphasized
the agency of risk-creating corporations, not the
complicity of individual risk bearers. Freudenberg’s
(1993) work on organizational recreancy concerns
conduct unbecoming the level of trust that an orga-
nization enjoys. But it raises the question whether
those who trust organizations do so appropriately,
and whether what we label “trust” is merely a con-
venient and undiscriminating kind of relying that re-
lieves us of the need to cope with risks ourselves. In
Lash and Wynne’s (1992) introduction to the trans-
lation of Beck’s Risk Society there is a view that
“the primary risk . . . is therefore that of social de-
pendency upon institutions and actors who may well
be . . . alien, obscure and inaccessible to most peo-
ple affected by the risks in question.” It sounds as
though lay people are victims of the institutions on
whom they have been rendered dependent. An alter-
native perspective is that lay people choose to be so
dependent because they benefit, choose to go along
with institutions that allow them to set aside pressing
issues of security, and prefer not to be bothered with
the difficult problems of making technology safe.
On a similar theme, Cranor (2007) makes a
strong case for regulating chemical risks in a way
that sustains individuals’ sovereignty over their bod-
ies. Harm-based regulation lets commercial interests
effectively experiment with their products on con-
sumers and the public. But this appears to stress the
way untested products can “remain in commerce pro-
viding benefits for companies” and gives an imbal-
anced picture where it does not also describe the
parallel benefits for consumers. Gillroy’s (1992) dis-
cussion of the unconditional right of citizens to
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their own agency makes broadly the same argument
as Cranor’s. Again it raises the question, however,
whether this simply lets individuals off the hook
of reflecting on how they gain from these appar-
ent losses, and how their taking of the gains sus-
tains the activity that produces the losses. An ex-
ample is that of brominated flame retardants (e.g.,
Alcock & Busby, 2006). These compounds help us
manage risks of fire, and in part we use them be-
cause a successful campaign to do something about
fire risks led to stringent performance standards for
goods like furniture. But they have been found in
widely distributed environmental compartments and
are suspected of toxicity, which has led to cam-
paigns to ban their use. To the extent that these cam-
paigns fail to acknowledge the benefits of their use,
they give no sense of what and how we gained in
the first place. Gow and Leahy (2005) explain the
public’s attribution of responsibility for environmen-
tal risks to “big business” on the basis of apathy,
withdrawal, and disenchantment with the political
process. But it also seems likely that people are
rarely confronted with an analysis of their own
complicity.
3. ANALYSIS
3.1. Complicity and General Usage
The general meaning of complicity found in dic-
tionaries refers to the states of being an accomplice,
being involved, being associated, or participating, all
with reference to an act that is criminal, wrong, or
questionable. The term therefore addresses a wide
spectrum of being, ranging from strong forms like
being an accomplice to a crime to weak forms like be-
ing merely associated with a questionable act. Some-
times, but not always, complicity is defined as choos-
ing to be involved, indicating that we do not always
limit complicity to situations where people have a
choice.
It is also instructive to see the term in recent use.
Table I is an illustrative rather than definitive sum-
mary of how complicity has been used in newspaper
articles. The sample consisted of articles in the U.K.
press, over the previous 100 days at the time of writ-
ing, referring jointly to complicity and risk in any con-
text.
Again this illustrates the relatively wide-ranging
usage. Some of the activities in which people are
said to be complicit involve extreme acts of evil and
criminality, whereas some (such as waste and indus-
Table I. Recent Journalistic Uses of “Complicit” or
“Complicity” in the Same Context as “Risk”
Complicity as
Failing to provide treatment for noncombatants in a conflict
Failing to take strong action against corruption
Ignoring evidence implicating people suspected
of racist violence
Supplying a drug for recreational not clinical purposes
Facilitating illegal trading
Failing to meet obligations to prevent genocidal acts
Failing to deliver indicted individuals to justice
Supplying arms to insurgencies
Being involved in serial child murder
Participating in a discredited culture
Remaining silent about the involvement of former terrorists
in legitimate government
Co-opting an educational endeavor for political ends
Promoting scientific views for self-serving purposes
Supporting a reprehensible system of production in the process
of simply trying to get by
Being the leader of a group committing atrocities
Playing a shared role in the mismanagement of the economy
Using legitimate authority to support illegal groups
committing atrocities
Having shared agency in hostile action
Gaining wealth from a system that engages in warfare
Sponsoring groups involved in atrocities
Failing to exercise oversight in local government
Assenting to the continuation of malign activity
Being prepared to take benefits from corruption
Suspending morality when allured by charisma
Participating in a disapproved sex act
Assisting in criminal acts
trial overproduction) are considerably milder. The
nature of the complicity similarly ranges from fairly
distant kinds of association to being virtually a prin-
cipal agent. In some cases the behavior is active, but
in other cases passive. Complicity has been ascribed,
for instance, to people who fail to act against a ques-
tionable activity, take benefits from it, or simply ig-
nore evidence of it. Indeed, Kissell (1999) argues that
it is rooted in Western language and narratives that
complicity extends to the idea of merely tolerating
wrongdoing. This goes well beyond the criminality
of being complicit, which specifically concerns causa-
tion: that is, “whether we can meaningfully say that
one person can ‘cause’ another person to engage in
volitional action” (Weisberg, 2000). Being a cause is
normally limited to the two aspects of inciting or aid-
ing a crime (e.g., Dubber, 2007). Criminal complic-
ity appears also to differ from more general usage
in referring to the state of being a partner in crime
without specifically being a lesser or minor partner
(Eboe-Osuji, 2005).
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The idea of being complicit in a risk, especially
when it is meant to support a general process of
risk management rather than criminalizing individu-
als, needs to reflect this breadth of general usage. If it
is to be informative rather than judgmental, it should
be inclusive, not exclusive: the milder kinds of com-
plicity are potentially as interesting as the stronger
kinds, not least because they are likely to apply to
many more people. In the remainder of this section
an attempt is therefore made to identify the multiple
bases for ascribing complicity, including those that
might be seen as only weak bases—insufficient for
condemning or criticizing someone, but nonetheless
relevant to questions of how best to manage risk.
3.2. Complicity and Causation
Having a causal role in some risk is not the
only basis for saying that someone is complicit in
it, but it is the most obvious basis. A large causal
contribution—one without which the risk cannot ex-
ist, for instance—intuitively implies more complicity.
This causal contribution is moderated by knowl-
edge. An example of how knowledge contributes to
complicity can be found in Weisberg’s (2000) discus-
sion of the individual who sold guns to the murderers
in the Columbine High School case. He had “at worst
exhibited recklessness, not knowledge, with respect
to the killers’ actions,” and in the end was convicted
only of “violating a very limited Colorado statute for-
bidding certain gun sales to minors.” But his involve-
ment with the murderers was complex, having met
them at a gun show some months earlier, procured
them a handgun, and supplied them with ammuni-
tion. Even though he was not charged with complicity
in the murder, it is very hard to argue that morally he
completely lacked complicity. The case thus speaks
to our feelings that—while specific knowledge is im-
portant to judgments of complicity—a lack of knowl-
edge does not entirely avoid it. If nothing else it is not
hard to imagine a gun being used to kill people, and
knowledge even of this imaginative kind can make
someone complicit.
Causation as a basis for complicity is also mod-
erated by agency. Questions of agency have been
seen generally as an important aspect of risk manage-
ment (Caplan, 2000), and the more agency someone
enjoys in making their causal contribution the more
complicit they are. But it also depends on what the
agency is directed at. The analysis of intentionality
(Searle, 1983; Bratman, 1987) indicates that you can
know some outcome is the by-product of what you
are endeavoring to do without that outcome being
your intention. Bratman (1987) describes the exam-
ple of a “strategic” bomber and a “terror” bomber.
Both end up knowingly bombing schools—the first
because (s)he has the intention of a bombing a fac-
tory that happens to be located next to a school, the
second because (s)he has the intention of bombing
the school in order to terrorize the population. In
the first case, the bombing of the school looks reck-
less but is not the intention; in the second case it is
the intention. We could argue that (1) the greatest
complicity arises when someone has the intention of
contributing to a risk; (2) less complicity arises when
they know their action will contribute to a risk with-
out that being their intention; and (3) even less com-
plicity arises when their contribution is not the result
of acting intentionally at all. An example of the last
case is when someone’s unavoidable physical con-
dition puts them specifically at risk in a particular
situation—for example, people who cannot swim on
board a boat that has capsized at sea. Examples of
the second case include situations in which actors en-
joy agency but believe they are caught in a “systemic
net of circumstances” (Horlick-Jones, 1996).
3.3. Complicity and Choosing
A connection between complicity and volun-
tarism was suggested earlier. Although there are dif-
ficulties with voluntarism as a construct, it still seems
reasonable to say that when someone has a choice,
and chooses a risky activity, they are complicit in
the risks they bear. It looks like a weaker form of
complicity than causal involvement because it sug-
gests someone choosing to expose themselves to a
risk whose form is determined by other agents. It is
also affected by the directness of the risk that follows
the choice. For example, someone might choose to
work in a location that forces them to use a ferry to
get to work. They appear less complicit in the risks of
traveling by ferry than someone who has the option
of a ferry and a journey by automobile, and chooses
the ferry explicitly.
An example of complicity arising from a vol-
untary exposure is that of workers using vibrating
machinery in highway construction and maintenance
firms. There are fairly rigid standards limiting the
time for which certain kinds of machinery are used
by individuals, to minimize the risk of contracting
conditions like “vibration white finger.” Workers oc-
casionally exceed these limits, generally to complete
a task that would otherwise be interrupted. Their
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employers also, inadvertently, create the conditions
in which it is often easier to exceed the limits than
obey them. Nonetheless, it is still a choice when
workers do exceed these limits, and so they ought to
be seen as complicit in the resulting risk.
Again the idea that choice means complicity
is moderated by knowledge. Being knowledgeable
about the risks entailed in a choice implies a greater
degree of complicity, as does failing to take reason-
able steps to know about a risk—that is, being “will-
fully ignorant.” Unfortunately, it is not always easy
to characterize knowledge in the context of risk be-
cause what we can and do know are often contested.
Another apparent example of complicity through
choice, with knowledge, is the use of cellphones fol-
lowing the publicizing of radiation risks (Burgess,
2004). There is a whole range of issues around the
scientific and public understanding of these risks that
makes it very hard to simply characterize someone as
knowledgeable or ignorant, and if ignorant, as will-
fully or inadvertently ignorant. It is therefore hard to
be specific about the extent of their complicity.
3.4. Complicity and Consent
Another reason for speaking of someone as be-
ing complicit in a risk, as a risk bearer, is that they
consent to it in some way. This is obviously the case
if the risk has been correctly and comprehensively
described, and the consent is given directly. Where
consent is indirect (MacLean, 1982), or where it is di-
rect but lacking in the normal requirements—for ex-
ample, being uninformed or coerced—complicity is
going to be substantially lower.
A further caveat is that, as Rayner (1987) points
out, cultural analysis reveals that different types of
organization favor different means of obtaining con-
sent. Individualist organizations favor revealed pref-
erences, bureaucratic organizations favor hypothet-
ical consent, and egalitarian groups favor explicit,
ranked values. It is not necessarily the case that those
whose consent is sought go along with the method
chosen by those seeking the consent. So, although
there is an obvious general link between consent and
complicity, the particular nature of the consent, and
the context, need to be taken into account. It seems
reasonable to say that (1) someone is more complicit
if they consent directly than if someone consents
for them (a politician in a representative democracy,
for instance); (2) someone is more complicit if they
consent specifically rather than generally, or consent
to a particular case rather than a general rule; and
that (3) someone is more complicit if the consent
is active rather than passive or by default. But the
consent-complicity relationship cannot be divorced
from the cultural context and reasoning about com-
plicity needs to be responsive to this context.
3.5. Complicity and Benefit
The early work on risk perception pointed to the
relationship between risk and benefit (Starr, 1969).
There is a case for considering those who benefit
from an activity as being complicit in risks arising
from it. It looks like a very weak form of complicity
if the risk is unknown to the beneficiary, but could be
much stronger where a group knows that taking ben-
efits sustains an activity and knows that it produces
risk. And even when beneficiaries lack this specific
knowledge, it would be naı¨ve of anyone to assume
that they can gain access to a benefit without some
kind of risk: the risk-benefit relationship seems to be
a fundamental aspect of life (Leiss & Chocioloko,
1994).
This does not mean that someone who is a bene-
ficiary necessarily feels as though they are complicit.
Studies of risk perception have found that, whereas
risk and benefit tend to be positively correlated in the
world, they can be negatively correlated in people’s
judgments (Slovic et al., 2004). We do not seem to as-
sume that an activity we derive much benefit from
entails a lot of risk. And, although one or two of
the entries in Table I referred to complicity as tak-
ing benefits, this is not a universal view. For exam-
ple, Robertson (1999) argues that using tissue from
aborted fetuses can be without “moral complicity” in
the underlying abortion, even though obtaining stem
cells from embryos necessarily kills those embryos.
We therefore need to see the attribution of com-
plicity to someone because they are a beneficiary as
being potentially controversial. But if the purpose of
the analysis is not to allocate blame or seek redress,
then there is less at stake in attributing complicity to
beneficiaries, and it has become a commonplace prin-
ciple that benefits justify risks, and vice versa.
3.6. Complicity and Participation
A final basis for complicity is participating in the
group or society that produces a risk—even when
the other criteria, like taking a benefit, giving con-
sent, and making a choice, do not apply. There is a
sense in which someone’s participation in some or-
der in which a risk arises makes them involved, and
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potentially makes a difference to how deserving they
are of protection from that risk.
Again, someone’s knowledge is relevant to our
ideas about their complicity, and again it matters
whether the ignorance is “willful.” Willful ignorance
looks worse than inadvertent ignorance, although
possibly not as bad as specific knowledge. An inter-
esting, if outlying case, of willful ignorance can be
found in Luban’s (1999) discussion of Albert Speer
and his guilt in the crimes of Nazism, particularly
the extermination camps. He describes how Speer
denied knowing anything about the Final Solution,
but also how he acknowledged that he chose not
to know. Yet he also seemed clear that willful ig-
norance was “just as bad as knowledge” and there-
fore accepted full responsibility for the Third Re-
ich’s crimes. Luban argues that Speer was treated
more leniently because he “understood that the best
way to dodge responsibility is to assume it—but not
to assume responsibility for any particular heinous
deeds.” There is also a sense that Speer gets credit for
being contrite, and his contrition looks greater when
he freely says that his willful ignorance was as bad
as knowledge. Thus, specific knowledge of a crime or
harm makes someone especially complicit; ignorance
subtracts from this complicity; willful ignorance sub-
tracts from this subtraction; but, possibly, contrition
subtracts from this subtraction in turn.
It could be argued that if there is no suspicion of
harm or wrongdoing, there could not be willful ig-
norance, and that inadvertent ignorance would get
someone off the hook of any kind of complicity. But
it is possible to think of cases where this is not true.
Perhaps the most obvious example is indeed that of
high-ranking people in organizations. Higher rank
means a greater embodiment of institutional behav-
ior in the individual manager (Iedema, 1998). Senior
people are complicit in the workings of an organiza-
tion and any risk it produces, even if they played no
role in producing the risk and had no suspicion of it.
Perhaps we just want to hold senior officers morally
responsible for risks in their organizations; perhaps
we think they are implicated causally—through exer-
cising insufficient oversight. It may be, though, that
they are simply an important part of a system that
wrongfully imposes risks, and that that is enough to
call them complicit.
There is a similar situation with people involved
in the production of some risk where the risk is a
cumulative consequence of many people acting in
the same way, none of whom intend the accumu-
lated outcome. In his essay on the so-called law
of unintended consequences, Vernon (1979) traces
a line from individuals dropping litter on hitherto
unspoiled mountains, through material acquisitive-
ness that cumulatively produces ecological dam-
age, to individuals acquiescing to authority that,
when accumulated, produces acts of tyranny. As we
reach the last of these cases, Vernon argues that
we find the individuals’ participation blameworthy—
even if it was not clear to them what the out-
come would be and even though, individually, they
could not have prevented it by withdrawing their
participation.
Participation of this kind is the basis of Kutz’s
(2000) analysis, which is that actors are responsi-
ble for the things they participate in, “regardless of
whether the participation makes a causal difference
to the outcome” (May, 2002). May’s (2002) review
of Kutz’s book points to another wartime case—the
bombing of Dresden, and the idea that many peo-
ple beyond the pilots of the aircraft that dropped
the bombs, and even beyond those who gave the or-
ders, bore responsibility. Where there is no aspect
of benefit, choice, or consent, let alone causation,
the complicity looks weak. Kutz’s notion of partici-
pation is participation in a wrongful act, not merely
participation in the organization that produces a
wrongful act. Nonetheless, it seems important to pre-
serve some residue of complicity for someone who
is part of a social order that produces or sanctions a
risk.
3.7. A Normative Framework
These five bases for complicity provide a simple
framework for guiding a complicity analysis. As has
been indicated, the context matters to this analysis,
and there are several factors moderating each of the
main bases. But if the purpose of the analysis is to en-
courage reflection—that is, to be formative—rather
than to reach a summative measure of some kind, it
seems better to aim for simplicity. Table II collects
these bases together and shows them in roughly de-
scending order of degree. It also shows what each ba-
sis adds to the next (when working upward) and what
each subtracts from the next (when working down-
ward).
Any analysis that uses these basic cues is unlikely
to be consensual, so the purpose should not be to
seek consensus. Different groups should be able to
perform their own analyses, and discrepancies among
different analyses should be treated as interest-
ing rather than problematic. Moreover, the analysis
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Table II. A Basic Framework to Prompt the Analysis of Complicity
Basis What is Removed in Moving Down to This Level What is Added in Moving Up to This Level
Causation Being able to produce or shape the risk
Choice Not bringing about or shaping the risk Being able to choose among alternatives
Consent Not having an alternative but to be involved in the risk Being able to agree to the risk
Benefit Not having the opportunity to agree or allow the risk Being able to gain something for bearing the risk
Participation Not gaining from the risk
should provide a background to decision making
rather than play a predetermined role in it. Judg-
ments of complicity are so obviously political as well
as analytical that the idea of complicity would lose
credibility, rather than gain it, from being a part of
a mechanistic process. These points seem to pre-
clude the use of complicity as part of a risk accep-
tance formula—for example, modifying risk accep-
tance thresholds for a given group in the light of
their complicity. But a formulaic analysis of complic-
ity looks unreasonable in any case.
Another approach is to use the analysis to im-
prove the day-to-day management of risk, rather
than formal decision processes. For example:
1. Where certain groups are complicit they may
be co-opted more effectively to deal with risk.
A complicity analysis should help reveal the
origin of many risks in joint, rather than in-
dividual, actions, and emphasize the shared,
nonexclusive responsibility that accompanies
them.
2. Such groups might be offered options that are
specifically adapted to their complicity. For
example, they might be offered insurance or
other “risk products” (Burgess, 2004, p. 21) in
which they pay a price, if a small one, for risk
reductions rather than placing the burden on
risk managers.
3. Ultimately, it may be that the aim becomes to
cope with, rather than mitigate, a risk. Cop-
ing might mean controlling a risk in some way,
but it might equally amount to reconciling
ourselves to it, attributing it to some agency
that makes it tolerable, forgetting about it,
reframing or reconceptualizing it. Douglas’s
(1986) observation on risks producing anger
rather than fear leads to the thought that cer-
tain groups may cope better with a risk when
they recognize their own complicity. It is im-
portant not to be glib about such possibilities,
but in some situations they might be suitable.
In the next section, we use a case study to explore
the difficulties of applying the basic framework, and
discuss what kind of decision process or management
process this informationmight be useful for.
4. CASE STUDY
4.1. Background to the Case
The case study is based on a risk assessment
undertaken for a national maritime regulator of
commercial operations on tidal rivers and estuar-
ies (with a mean of 148 passengers on a vessel),
inland waterways (a mean of 48 passengers), lakes
(105), and coastal waters (76). The case was cho-
sen because there are some obvious ways in which
well-defined groups, such as passengers and em-
ployees, can contribute to the causation of hazards.
There are some fairly obvious ways in which con-
sent is given—as employees, or as passengers book-
ing a passage. And the risks are generally mun-
dane: which is not to discount their scale (the loss
of the Marchioness in 1989 in the United King-
dom killed 51 people) but to say that they are not
arcane, complex, obscure, or especially technical.
They generally have their roots in the kind of or-
ganizational dysfunction that most people are famil-
iar with, not in the limits of scientific understand-
ing. This kind of situation also represents a middle
ground between risks in which there is no, or virtu-
ally no, complicity, and risks in which the complicity
is obvious and considerable.
4.2. An Indicative Analysis
The purpose of the case study was to find out
what kind of judgments would be needed to apply
the framework sketched out in the last section, and to
get some sense of the problems that accompany these
judgments. Our starting point was the original risk
assessment, and the complicity analysis broadly fol-
lowed its structure. Themain hazard categories in the
risk assessment were collision, grounding, contact,
fire or explosion, flooding, and personal accidents.
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Table III. Local Passenger Vessels Study—Hazards and Complicity Types for Passengers
Identified Hazard Potential Complicity of Risk Bearers Possible Moderating Factors
Crowd control failure on board, or
during boarding, or disembarking
Causal: crowding behavior, impatience
(moderate), ignoring crew instructions
(high)
Events beyond individuals’ influence (high)
Incompetent or provocative crew action
(moderate)
Instability, obstruction, or poor condition
of gangway, jetty, or pontoon during
boarding
Causal: queue jumping (moderate),
lacking in agility (moderate)
Design and condition of physical environment
(high)
Harmful contact with mooring lines Causal: inattention (moderate) Distracting events (moderate)
Choice: crossing barriers (moderate) Design of physical environment (moderate)
Access to vessel on steep angle or by
disabled or intoxicated passengers
Causal: disablement, intoxication (high) Lack of agency in personal capacities such as
disability (high)
Harm to limbs projecting outside vessel Causal: inattention (high) Design of physical environment (moderate)
Collision with berth Causal: distracting behavior (moderate) Conditions arising that demand attention
(moderate)
Collision impact with bridges, moorings,
or other vessels
As above As above
Collision with swimmers or rowers Causal: unpredictable behavior
Choice: swimming in crowded waters
Difficult conditions reducing visibility or control
(moderate)
Incompetent or inappropriate boatmanship
(moderate)
Fires and explosions on vessel Causal: taking flammable materials on
board, using them in hazardous areas
(high)
Flammable materials left exposed (moderate)
Acts of vandalism or terrorism Tolerating: acquiescing to vandalism
(low)
Language barriers in understanding
safety instructions
Causal: lacking native language Lack of agency in personal capacities (moderate
to low)
Boat rage Causal: individual behavior (high) Crowded waters (low)
Panic among passengers in tunnels Causal: individual reaction, crowd
behavior (moderate)
Lack of agency in behaviors exhibited in panic
(moderate)
Harm during evacuation Causal: individual capacities such as
being a poor swimmer, intoxication,
being disabled
Lack of agency in certain capacities (high to
low)
All hazards Benefit: receiving a service, often a
leisure service (low)
No alternative to using the service (moderate)
Choice: choosing the operator (low) Being a child or otherwise having less capacity
to choose (high)
Consent: going along with the obvious
risks of sailing (moderate)
Being unfamiliar with sailing (moderate)
Fault tree and event tree analysis were used in an
engineering-like assessment process, based on a mix-
ture of expert judgment and historical data. This
quantified the annual risk to crew and passengers
from 47 hazards, which were not mutually exclusive.
Some of these seem to involve little complicity (e.g.,
low flying aircraft), so were removed from the anal-
ysis. In Table III the remaining sample of hazards is
listed, together with some possible bases for attribut-
ing complicity to passengers as risk bearers. An indi-
cation of how complicity might be moderated in par-
ticular cases is given in the third column of the table.
Although the analysis concentrates on passengers as
risk bearers, it could equally well be replicated for
crews.
An attempt is also made in the table to give a
very approximate idea of the degrees of complicity
involved, in both the main bases for judging complic-
ity and the moderating factors.
4.3. Observations on the Analysis
Table III suggests that most complicity in this
case arises from causal involvement. Risk bearers are
complicit in, for example, crowd control failures be-
cause their behaviors or dispositions are necessary
to the harm in question. This emphasis on causal in-
volvement is partly an artifact of following the struc-
ture of the original risk assessment, which is largely
organized around a causal analysis. The other bases
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for complicity, like giving consent and receiving ben-
efit, are less clearly linked to particular hazards, and
so are grouped together at the bottom of the table
under a nonspecific, “all hazards” heading.
Assigning degrees of complicity to the entries in
Table III was problematic because even in the con-
text of a specific hazard, there was a wide range of
potential behaviors. For example, crowd control fail-
ure can arise from antisocial, unreasonable, or in-
appropriate behavior on the part of passengers, or
from confusing, aggressive, or incompetent action on
the part of staff. The risk bearers are also a hetero-
geneous group—some being children, some drunk,
some disabled, and so on.
Another observation is that there is no distinc-
tion between two kinds of complicity judgment that
have different meanings. Someone buying a ticket,
who chooses to benefit from an activity with obvious
risks, goes along with those risks and could be said to
be weakly complicit in them. But if we look at a pas-
senger in the present, and suggest it is possible they
could behave in a way that creates a risk in the future
(e.g., through drunkenness), we are only saying they
would be complicit if that is how they behaved. It is
more a risk of complicity than complicity in a risk. It
is therefore important to remember that the purpose
of the analysis is not to censure people, but instead
to assist in the process of managing risk. A risk man-
ager can say to someone who is complicit in a risk
“we will spend less on mitigating that risk because
of your complicity,” and can equally say to someone
who is at risk of being complicit “we will spend less
on mitigating that risk because, if it arises, you will be
complicit in it.”
There is a similar problem with failing to distin-
guish wrongdoing and harm. Some of the judgments
in Table III point to wrongdoing because they are
about behaviors that put others, as well as the agent
in question, at risk. Individual acts on boats can pro-
duce collective disasters. It is also a commonplace
idea that drunken or irresponsible people who risk
their own necks also risk the necks of those who try to
rescue them. Some of the entries also point to wrong-
doing where it can be construed that the corporation
in question exercised insufficient care. But there are
some entries in Table III that would be hard to read
as wrongdoing, and in such cases the idea of complic-
ity looks overextended.
A fourth observation is that some of the judg-
ments in Table III are simply debatable. For exam-
ple, there are uncertainties about the extent of ac-
tors’ agency when they panic, or behave as part of
a crowd. There are uncertainties about knowledge:
failure modes involving “overcrowding” raise the
question as to how much those involved in the crowd
can know what amounts to overcrowding, what oc-
curs as a result, and how much they can rely on the
crew to manage overcrowding. And there are prob-
lems with choice. For instance, are disabled people
more complicit when choosing to place themselves at
higher risk, by choosing to sail? Or should we work
from the assumption that any individual choosing to
consume the same service as someone else can expect
the provider to ensure they bear the same risk?
5. CONCLUSION
Analyzing complicity in a risk is essentially about
how high a horse you can get upon when demanding
protection from that risk. The more complicity a risk
bearer can be regarded as having, the more risk man-
agers can question the allocation of resources to pro-
tecting them. It does not have to follow that resources
are denied when people are complicit, but the need
for protection is then less axiomatic. This complicity
arises in a number of ways, ranging from causal in-
volvement, through choice, consent, and taking ben-
efits, to merely participating in a group or activity in
which the risk arises. How much the people in ques-
tion know, how willful is their ignorance, and how
much agency they can exercise all modify our view of
their complicity.
There are various problems in this analysis, no-
tably the indeterminacy of some of the judgments
that need making. But even the limited complic-
ity analysis given here provides a systematic way of
reasoning about the role of risk bearers, and other
groups more widely, in the generation and manage-
ment of risks that are seen questionable or wrongful
in someway. It offers a way of looking at the different
perspectives of different groups, it might contribute
to a more authentic kind of risk communication (Ot-
way &Wynne, 1989), and it seems to fit the notion of
a “risk characterization” that is much broader than
the usual risk assessment (Stern & Fineberg, 1996).
Variousx lines of further work could be sug-
gested. One would be to examine complicity in the
context of quite different risks, particularly those in
which the risk is of widespread collective harm such
as climate change. A second possibility would be to
test expressed preferences. Groups who might be
thought complicit in a risk could be asked: “If you
accept complicity what price would you pay to have
this removed in all considerations of management or
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compensation?” And risk managers could be asked:
“If you attribute complicity to some group what con-
tribution would you expect to receive from it toward
the costs of making the risk acceptable?” Another
line of work would be to incorporate a complicity
analysis explicitly in a public consultation, as a way of
testing its usefulness in revealing what distinguishes
the perspectives of different stakeholders. Finally, it
would be illuminating to survey how people in vari-
ous groups reason about complicity, when they think
it arises and what they think it entails.
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